Sunday, March 29, 2009

Geithner on George Stephanopoulos

Watching the George Stephanopoulos show this morning (I'm not sure why, but....), but here are some notes from the interview:

  • "People with ideas still want to come to the United States."
  • "We need banks to take risk again - take a chance again on providing credit to that business..."
  • After Stephanopoulos introduced Paul Krugman's comments that the Geithner plan is financial hocus pocus - "This is a conservative structure to have the private investor with the government sharing the risk."
  • Stephanopoulos asked how much is left in TARP? - "$135 billion in uncommitted, including money coming back from banks that are stronger than thought and are not in need to the money originally allocated to them."
  • On inflation that could be caused by printing money to finance the federal actions - "We'll never have hyperinflation. Increased money supply will not cause hyperinflation."
  • Government has historically taken too long to assist in recovery, and pulled out of recovery mode too soon as soon as a glimmer of light was seen - Japan and Sweden in the 1990s, the United States Savings & Loans crisis, and the Great Depression.
  • "Right now, we're about where we thought we'd be."
  • "Damage from this situation is brutal, indiscriminate."
  • "The market will not solve this. The error is not doing enough."

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Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Milton Ezrati at the IMN Distressed Investment Summit

Milton Ezrati, Lead Economist at Lord Abbott, opened Information Management Network “Distressed Investment Summit: Credit Crunch Investment Strategies for Institutional Investors” conference on Monday. From his viewpoint, the market is running on emotion, which is covering up current market fundamentals. And the market ran on emotion over the last couple of years, which previously covered up really bad fundamentals. But the markets have over-reacted and are pricing assets to fear instead of to value. And the markets are slowly recovering from the emotion-based marking. Got all that?

Ezrati illustrated his point of view with a few examples:

  • The TED Spread: Has historically bubbled around 25-30 basis points. It rose to 460 basis points in November 2008 and has since dropped down to 100 basis points - still not back to normal, but recovering.
  • Credit Spreads: Junk bonds, which normally trade around 500-600 basis points, reached 2100 basis points but have fallen to 1500-1700 basis points.
  • Merrill Lynch: In their sale to Bank of America, mortgage assets were priced at $0.22/$1, indicating that 78% of assets are worthless; yet 60% of sub-prime borrowers are current (and this doesn’t even count the intrinsic value of the properties themselves…)
In discussing today’s market as compared to the Great Depression, Ezrati offered some salient points:
  • There was no bank deposit insurance then.
  • There was no unemployment insurance then.
  • Unemployment rose to 30% during the Depression, versus 8.1% now
  • 9000 banks went bust during the Depression, versus 40 banks now.
Other key points from his address:
  • Worker Productivity rose in Q4-2008, even with the massive layoffs in the economy. (Those numbers have since been revised to show a -0.4% downturn in productivity, but given the sharp increase in unemployment in Q4, this value seems to indicate that productivity is still ahead of employment declines.)
  • Personal Savings have risen to nearly $600 billion from nearly $0 in 2007. (You can verify this at the Bureau of Economic Analysis.)
  • While the current government’s actions may create an inflationary environment, he is not forecasting any inflation at this time.
  • When asked about China’s role in financing our debt, Ezrati likened the situation to a manufacturing company subsidizing a customer at a loss, only to gain when selling the end product. As long as China continues to run an export-oriented economy, then they have little choice but to finance US debt because of their reliance on the US for its economic base.
  • When asked about drawing an analogy between Japan plight in the 1990s to the current U.S. situation, Ezrati cited that Japan’s government failed to acknowledge bad debt at the start (versus the mark-to-market requirements in the U.S.), that Japan’s sub-prime debt was non-paying (versus a 60% repayment rate in the U.S.), and there was not much of a corporate debt market in Japan (borrowers had to go to a bank for a loan). So overall, Ezrati indicated that the current situation in the U.S. does not compare to that of Japan’s a decade ago.
Overall, Ezrati saw reasons for abatement in the market’s negative direction, but as you might expect, hedged that with a little caution that future economic events such as inflation could hamper recovery in the intermediate.

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Wednesday, March 11, 2009

"Free Market Voice"

Working on a new project:

http://freemarketvoice.org

More info to come in the next few weeks after I get through the glut of work and teaching "to-dos" this week.

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Monday, March 9, 2009

Paul Volcker on Bank vs. Hedge Fund Risk-Taking

Paul Volcker, former Federal Reserve Chairman regarding risk profiles of banks vs. hedge funds:

"Maybe we ought to have a two-tiered financial system," Mr. Volcker said at conference at New York University's Stern School of Business. Banks "should not be taking extraordinary risks in the marketplace."
This is the basic premise of the financial system. Bank are inherently supposed to be risk-averse institutions, as discussed in this article about the US government's interference in the free market.

The rest of Mr. Volcker's comments are in the rest of the article on HedgeWorld.com.


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Thursday, March 5, 2009

Recap: "Stimulus SmackDown: Can Deficit Spending Save the Economy?"

It wasn’t Ali-Frazier or even Hagler-Hearns, but the live debate hosted by University of California-Davis Institute of Government Affairs last night between Michele Boldrin of the CATO Institute and Washington Univeristy and J. Bradford DeLong of UC-Berkeley – “Stimulus SmackDown: Can Deficit Spending Save the Economy?” - proved entertaining nonetheless. As you might conjecture based on their institutional affiliations, DeLong argued in support of the recent U.S. economic stimulus bill while Boldrin vociferously argued against it.

Here’s a recap of the action:

Bradford DeLong

DeLong is a self-professed economic historian, and specifically denies that he is a macroeconomist. (That seemed to be a theme throughout the evening…) His approach to the economic stimulus package is a simple one, and one heard frequently throughout political circles – the patient is bleeding, therefore we need to apply a bandage. While that bandage will not heal the severed artery, we should focus on triage first and long-term solutions later.

Today’s economic environment now reaches far beyond a housing bubble – it’s clearly spilled over into other parts of the economy, so focusing solutions more broadly to include infrastructure projects, health care reform, and monetary allocations to individual states is an approach consistent with our economic challenges. It’s okay to increase the deficit now to achieve a surplus later. We should be spending more and taxing less in the short term to pull us out of today’s emergency.

DeLong argued that empirical studies show that when one industry gets motivated and decides to spend, it can turn an entire economy. In this case, the stimulus plan is a decision by society to spend and that “the government’s money is as good as anyone’s. It is a reasonable and intelligent thing to take this action on our own behalf.” That said, DeLong acquiesced that an economic stimulus package does not equate to long term economic growth, but continued to emphasize is argument on triage first, operation later.

DeLong supports the “Ackerlof’s approach” to taming the economy. (George Ackerlof won the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to psychology in the marketplace and has recently written a new book – “Animal Spirits.”) DeLong also argued that the Swedish Banking Model deployed in the 1990’s is sound approach that should be considered in the United States.

His presentation was short and to the point – do something now and deal with the consequences once the economy is recovering. We are facing significant economic problems now, and something needs to be done immediately to stem the tide of ongoing negative economic trends.

Michele Boldrin

Boldrin is a general equilibrium economist, which means that he focuses on the microeconomic side of supply and demand – equilibrium models starting from individuals and firms, then aggregating into macroeconomic analysis (whereas macroeconomics tend to take an “top-down” aggregated approach to economics.) As Boldrin put it, macroeconomists “suffer from the aggregate.”

He likened the approach of economic stimulus to that of rock-climbing – rushing to decisions serves to detriment of the participant. The notion that “We have to do something!” will ultimately weaken the economy even further. “Even the Bush tax cuts - $400? They avoided the real economic problem.” The real problem lies in the financial markets and overall structural dynamics of the economy.

Boldrin focused two primary arguments against the stimulus package in its current form. First, he cited empirical evidence that show increases in public spending do not have a multiplier effect on the economy. That is, when government spends, the economy feels only the net effects of the primary spending – there is not downstream multiplier effect. In fact, he maintained that the Keynesian multiplier for government spending was perhaps less than 1. Several prominent economists share this perspective, including Robert Barro and Bob Hall and Susan Woodward. Of course, other leading economists such as Valerie Ramey and Christina and David Romer contest that the government multiplier is greater than 1. Shocking -economists don’t agree on something. (Christina Romer is the Chair of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors, perhaps for good reason based on her research findings.)

Boldrin also showed correlation empirics from several of the G7 countries - France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Japan – which all indicate that there is no correlation between public spending and Gross National Product for any of these countries. He also clearly stated that his issue is not with the general concept of government spending, but whether it is useful for economic stimulus. He cautioned the Obama administration on shrouding political aims under the guise of economic stimulus. Quick spending does not help the acute.

For example, what about increased health care spending that is included in the stimulus package? This is an industry currently with rising employment according to the January 2009 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, so two outcomes will be evident from these spending increases. First, we’ll end up paying higher wages to the current labor market in the health care industry. Second the “hammer and nail guy” in Las Vegas will not benefit from the stimulus because he won’t become a nurse by year’s end. Yes, there are provisions for creating a health IT system, but relative to the other allocations in the stimulus plan, they account for a small part of the overall allocation to the health care stimulus line items.

In a related argument, Boldrin argued that focusing the economic stimulus on spurring demand for durable goods such as automobiles and housing (which generally require credit, and in turn, require fixing the credit market) will only increase employment in the production of that good in those industries – it does not create overall employment. (This is the general equilibrium economist showcasing his traits.) If we focus on stimulating demand in the industries hardest hit by the recession, we are going to be pushing for the purchase of SUVs and houses in Nevada. Isn’t that how we got here in the first place? (DeLong believes the labor is more flexible than Boldrin, even using the example of the person redoing his bathroom who was a janitor just two months ago. Labor mobility is a hotly debated topic among labor economists.)

The problem with increased spending now is that history shows that we do not decrease the spending later. There is never guarantee that these government programs will be cut later. “Pay-as-you-go” as is proposed is not the same as cutting spending and taxes in the longer term. “Pay-as-you-go” can simply mean increased taxes in the longer term to pay for these social programs now inserted into annual government expenditures.

Boldrin often took the debate away from the straight “Yea or Nay” on the economic stimulus package and focused his attention on the state of the U.S. financial system, again examining the effects of public spending on economic growth, illustrating the cases of Japan in the 1990s and Chile in the 1980s. Japan took the approach of fiscal spending for many years and created a “zombie state” in banking. Japan’s long-term economic growth struggles throughout the 1990s are well-documented. Alternately, the solutions of the Chilean banking crisis in the early 1980s focused on cleansing the banks and swiftly as possible. Boldrin supported taking the latter approach, and said that we need to purge the leadership of the banking sector - “keeping the same guys is a bad idea.” When credit crunch creates the problem, you need to start with the banks first.

With regard to the Swedish model introduced by DeLong, Boldrin agreed because Sweden exercised fiscal constraint in lowering taxes and spending – not the basis on the U.S. economic stimulus package.

Selected Audience Questions

“If there is true slack in the labor market (unused capacity), and we assume that the social cost of the infrastructure and other social programs included in the stimulus package equals long-term social benefit, doesn’t that mean that building a bridge or school now means getting that public works project at a bargain because spending more now means less spending later?"

DeLong : Agreed.

Boldrin: Yes, but we must mandate that when government costs rise now, they must be cut down the road and there is evidence in our economic and political history that these cuts do not occur.

Macroeconomics suffers from too many assumptions – flexible prices, labor and capital mobility, the efficient market hypothesis, rational expectations theory, perfect information, perfect competition, and many others. Isn’t basing policy decision on macroeconomic theory a flawed approach given the complexity of our economic environment?

Both DeLong and Boldrin agreed with this point. DeLong went on to say that the most relevant lectures he attended were that of Charles Kindleberger, who wrote “Manias, Panics, and Crashes,” which is consistent with his support of Ackerlof’s plan for the economy.

Boldrin went on to say that the New Keynesians (such as DeLong, Obama, and Christina Romer) suffer from the same problem. There is too much “master of the universe” – that Greenspan or Bernanke or the government can move some levers and we’ll all become rich. Economics is too complex to assume singular actions can move the economy. There are technology shocks, demand shocks, energy shocks, changes in productivity, and other exogenous effects that are constantly affecting the economy.

When did the Great Depression end and why?

DeLong used this question to further support the need for emergency spending. He stated that the Great Depression ended briefly in 1937 when the United States started to show signs of recovery in 1935 and 1936. Roosevelt ended many of the public works programs such as the WPA and the economy slipped back into negative territory – Delong felt that FDR released government intervention to soon. Then World War II arose and the increased war-time spending further bolstered the economy through even more government spending, and eventually pulled us back to stability in the mid-1940s. Using this logic, it’s very clear that government spending pulled the United States out of the Great Depression.

Final Takeaways

I attended the “Smackdown” expecting to side with Bradford DeLong based on his blog entries over recent weeks about the overall meltdown of the economy. I must admit, he’s done a good job hiding his Keynesian tendencies…

I was left with a statement from Boldrin that ultimately strengthened my viewpoint against the vastness of the stimulus package (Admittedly, I went into the event biased against the broad provisions included in the bill such as the health care and other social provisions…):

“What happens when we come back in six months with 12% unemployment and are having the same debate? Will the response be – ‘We have to do something!’?”

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[The entire debate was videotaped and should be available at www.iga.ucdavis.edu in the next day or so.]

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